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Introduction1 
In the last two decades, a series of crises have hit the European Union (i.e., the Eurozone crisis, the 
sovereign debt crisis, the Great Recession, the refugee crisis, Brexit, and finally the COVID-19 pandem-
ic). All crises have challenged the solidarity between member states of the European Union as well as 
between European citizens and have put the question to the fore: How strong is European solidarity? 
Are the member states of the EU and European citizens ready to help each other? Or do they think 
first and foremost of the interests of their country and the citizens of their nation state?  
By European solidarity, we understand a form of solidarity that goes beyond one’s own nation 
state, and where the recipients of solidarity are either other EU countries or citizens of other EU mem-
ber states. We assume that the strength of European solidarity can only be relationally determined in 
comparison to other territorial spaces. The comparison with national solidarity is especially relevant, 
because historically the nation state has been the central institution of solidarity – and in many ways 
still is. Simultaneously, globalization processes may have led to the fact that the entire world has be-
come the frame of reference for solidarity. We thereby differentiate between three different territorial 
spaces of solidarity: solidarity between citizens of the same nation state, solidarity between member 
                                                          
1 This article is based on the presentation made together with Holger Lengfeld (Universität Leipzig) in the plenary session 
„Europa inmitten globaler Spannungen“. The paper strongly refers to chapter 2 of a co-authored monograph (Gerhards 
et al. 2019).  
 Research for this article is part of the Cluster of Excellence “Contestations of the Liberal Script” (EXC 2055, Project-ID: 
390715649), which is funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under 
Germany's Excellence Strategy – EXC 2055.  The empirical findings in this paper are based on data from the “Transna-
tional European Solidarity Study” (TESS). TESS is part of a joint venture between two research groups: (1) the interna-
tional research project Solidarity in Europe: Empowerment, Social Justice and Citizenship – SOLIDUS funded by the Eu-
ropean Commission in the context of the Horizon 2020 research program (Grant Agreement No. 649489), and (2) the 
research unit Horizontal Europeanization funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) (FOR 1539). 
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states and their citizens within the EU, and global solidarity in the sense of solidarity with countries 
and citizens outside of the EU.  
Estimating the strength of European solidarity in relation to national and global solidarity is, how-
ever, not only an empirical research question, but touches on the normative question of the legitimacy 
of different solidarity spaces. Is it legitimate to favor citizens of one’s own nation state over citizens of 
Europe and over people outside of Europe? Does it not follow from the fact that all people are equal 
that no distinction should be made between different solidarity spaces, so that all people, no matter in 
which country they live, have the same right to solidarity? The legitimacy of different solidarity spaces 
is a controversial topic in social philosophy. As we will see in the next section, two camps can be dis-
tinguished. Cosmopolitans argue that support for people in need should have a global outreach and 
not stop at any border, while communitarians assume that solidarity is based on connectedness and 
requires common institutions. The stronger the connectedness and the denser the institutional net-
work, the stronger solidarity will be empirically, which at the same time is normatively justified.  
In section three we explore the question of whether European citizens’ attitudes toward solidarity 
tend to follow the cosmopolitan or the communitarian position. Based on a survey we conducted in 13 
EU countries, we examine the extent to which citizens are willing to support people within the three 
solidarity spaces. The results support the communitarian view of solidarity. Solidarity with citizens of 
one’s own country receives the greatest support. At the same time, the majority of respondents are 
also in favor of European solidarity, although the level of solidarity at the European level is below the 
level of nation-state support. Finally, the results show that European solidarity enjoys significantly 
higher support than universal, global solidarity. In the conclusion (section four) we will summarize the 
results by relating the empirical findings to the philosophical debate. Overall, the empirical data sup-
port more of a communitarian than a cosmopolitan position.  
Legitimate spaces of solidarity: cosmopolitans versus 
communitarians 
The reference point in the philosophical debate for evaluating the legitimacy of different spaces of 
solidarity are usually social justice theories. We follow Andrea Sangiovanni‘s (2012, 2013) summary of 
the discussion and distinguish between cosmopolitans on the one hand and communitarians on the 
other.  
Cosmopolitans argue that support for people in need should not stop at any territorial border. 
They are therefore in favor of global solidarity (Pogge 2008). For example, if two people find them-
selves in a similar plight, the first person in their own country and the other person in a foreign coun-
try, then both have the same legitimate right to solidarity. The rationale for cosmopolitan global soli-
darity refers to the idea of equality of all people. Because all human beings are born equal and be-
cause the place of birth and thus the territory where they will grow up and probably spend their life is 
determined by pure coincidence, there is no legitimate reason to justify advantaging or disadvantaging 
people based on their territorial location. This principle of equal treatment applies not only to funda-
mental human rights, but also to the distribution of resources to people in need, that is, it also applies 
to an ethic of solidarity (Sangiovanni 2013). 
The idea of cosmopolitan solidarity implies in turn that the existing interactions between people, 
the concentration and institutionalization of interactions as manifested in the nation state, for exam-
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ple, should be irrelevant for the question of solidarity. Accordingly, cosmopolitans criticize theories 
that assume solidarity should be bound to the existence of a social community.  
From the perspective of cosmopolitans, the institutionalization of European solidarity is the first 
step in the right direction, because it is here that the national container is being broken open and ex-
tended toward the ‘world’. All Europeans, and not just the citizens of a nation state, should be treated 
as equals, and everyone has an equal right to solidarity. This replaces national communitarianism with 
European communitarianism. And this is to be welcomed, but it is not enough from the cosmopolitan 
point of view because solidarity should not stop at the borders of Europe either, but should embrace 
the citizens of all countries (Benhabib 2004). With regard to our study, a cosmopolitan perspective 
leads to the following conclusions: national solidarity can claim the lowest legitimacy for itself and 
global solidarity the highest, while European solidarity can be located between the two poles. 
Communitarians, by contrast, assume that there are not only empirically different boundaries and 
thus different social spaces of solidarity, but that these spaces can also claim different legitimacy for 
themselves. Solidarity between people only arises when people are connected, when there is interac-
tion between them, and when a system of norms and institutions and a feeling of communitas emerg-
es on the basis of these interactions. Some communitarians assume that the state is needed to create 
such communities (Nagel 2005). Depending on the density of the interactions and the strength of the 
community, solidarity will vary in intensity. 
The argument that the extent of solidarity is linked to an existing community is in substance an 
empirical statement and not a normative justification. Yet, norms cannot be derived from empirical 
facts. In this respect, a normatively more plausible communitarian justification is the one developed 
by Andrea Sangiovanni (2012, 2013; see also Singer 2016). He described his own position as ‘reciproci-
ty-based internationalism’. His core argument is the following: the creation of communities, such as 
that of a family, a nation state, or the European Union, occurs for a specific purpose; people enter into 
relationships and interactions in order to produce collective goods. By being willing to produce such 
collective goods and by participating in their production, people acquire the right to be supported by 
the other members of the community if necessary. Hence, the claim to solidarity arises as a result of 
participation in the production of collective goods. A legitimate claim to solidarity arises when people 
have participated in the production of collective goods. Accordingly, demands for social solidarity at all 
levels of governance can be understood as demands for a fair return on the mutual production of 
important collective goods (Sangiovanni 2013, S. 217). 
Sangiovanni applies this general principle to different types of communities. For example, the 
modern nation state consists of institutions that guarantee internal and external securities and pro-
vide people with access to the labor market, education, and health care. Citizens of a country partici-
pate in the production of these collective goods, for instance by completing compulsory military 
service or being prepared to defend their country in the event of war and by being willing to obey the 
laws and to pay taxes so that the state can also guarantee the safety, education, and health of its 
citizens. 
Sangiovanni interprets European integration as a process of new community building with the aim 
of producing collective goods. Above all, the creation of a common European market and a single cur-
rency was carried out with the aim and promise of increasing the prosperity of all European citizens. 
At the same time, however, the risks have changed with the European integration process. For exam-
ple, the free movement of workers in Europe can lead to an increase in unemployment in some coun-
tries as a consequence of intra-European migration. Also, the introduction of the euro can lead to cur-
rency and economic crises. Since it is not known in advance how high such risks are and who will be 
particularly affected by the risks, the insurance principle of solidarity applies here too: all those who 
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are involved in the project of integration and who have participated in its realization have a right to 
solidarity in ‘case of accident’, just as they are entitled to ‘consume’ the fruits of the collective property. 
For our study, this argument leads to the following conclusion: despite globalization and European-
ization processes, the nation state remains the dominant space of interactions in the production of 
collective goods. It is therefore empirically reasonable to expect that national solidarity will be more 
pronounced than European or global solidarity. And since the European Union has a much denser 
network of interactions and institutions than the global world society, European solidarity will be 
stronger than global solidarity. From the point of view of communitarians, however, the empirically 
expected ranking of the three solidarity groups is also a normatively justified ranking. Citizens give 
more to the nation state than to the European Union, and they give more to the EU than to world so-
ciety. In the following section, we will discuss whether the empirical data support more of a communi-
tarian perspective or more of a cosmopolitan view. 
Empirical findings: The strength of national, European, and global 
solidarity 
The empirical findings are based on a comparative survey, the “Transnational European Solidarity 
Study” (TESS) that was conducted using computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI) in 13 European 
countries (Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, France, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Por-
tugal, Slovakia, Spain, and Sweden) in 2016. Respondents in the survey are citizens eligible to vote in 
national elections in the respective country. The final sample consists of 12,500 respondents (for more 
detailed information see Gerhards et al. 2019).  
We do not only distinguish between different spaces of solidarity but also between different do-
mains of solidarity. In the context of this paper, we focus on two domains of solidarity only: Fiscal soli-
darity, defined as citizens’ willingness to support indebted regions and countries financially (1). Welfare 
state solidarity, defined as citizens’ agreement to support those in need – unemployed, sick, and the 
elderly (2).2 
Fiscal Solidarity: Solidarity with countries facing economic hardship 
Fiscal solidarity is defined as citizens’ willingness to show solidarity with regions and countries facing 
serious economic hardship. Following our theoretical considerations, we measured attitudes toward 
fiscal solidarity on three spatial levels: solidarity between regions within a nation state, between EU 
member states, and between EU member states and countries outside the EU.3 
 
                                                          
2 The two other domains are: Territorial solidarity, defined as peoples’ willingness to reduce inequality between poor and 
rich countries and solidarity with refugees defined as the support to grant asylum to refugees.   
3 The wording of the questions was the following: We have learned in recent years that regions within countries as well as 
entire countries can fall into a severe debt crisis. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements.  
 (1) In times of crisis, the better off regions in [COUNTRY] should give financial help to other regions in [COUNTRY] facing severe 
economic difficulties.  
 (2) In times of crisis, [COUNTRY] should give financial help to other EU countries facing severe economic difficulties.  
 (3) In times of crisis, [COUNTRY] should give financial help to other countries outside of the European Union facing severe eco-
nomic difficulties. 
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Figure 1: Fiscal solidarity by different spatial levels  
As Figure 1 shows, the nation state is still the space with the highest legitimacy. A huge majority of 83% 
of respondents want to give financial help to suffering regions within their own country. But surpris-
ingly, the majority of European citizens also see the EU as a legitimate space of solidarity. Two thirds of 
all respondents agree with their country providing financial aid to EU countries. Fiscal solidarity with 
countries outside of the EU is significantly lower than fiscal solidarity with EU countries and the sup-
port is not shared by a majority of respondents.  
The fact that we asked respondents to evaluate the three different items at the same time might 
lead to an overestimation of respondents’ willingness to engage in solidarity, as they were not 
prompted to favor one space of solidarity over the others. Therefore, we asked respondents a second 
question that puts them into a decision-making situation by requiring them to decide which of the 
three spaces they would help first and which second.4 
As Figure 2 demonstrates, the differences between the three solidarity spaces are much more pro-
nounced compared to Figure 1. The overwhelming majority of EU citizens would choose to help the 
regions within their own country first. Yet, in the second scenario, where we asked respondents which 
space should be the second priority, the picture changed considerably. Here, the majority of respond-
ents opted in favor of assisting crisis-affected EU countries. Only a small number of respondents took 
a purely cosmopolitan position of choosing to help countries outside of the EU. We will discuss how to 
interpret these findings in relation to the philosophical debate after having presented the empirical 
results concerning the second domain of solidarity. 
 
 
                                                          
4 The wording of the question was the following: Assuming a decision about priority has to be made: in your opinion, where 
should financial support be provided to first: 
 (1) To a region within [COUNTRY]. 
 (2) To another country in the European Union. 
 (3) To another country outside of the European Union. 
 And where should it be provided to second? 
 (1) To a region within [COUNTRY]. 
 (2) To another country in the European Union. 























JÜRGEN GER HARDS  
6 
 
Figure 2: Fiscal solidarity and spaces of solidarity: first and second priority   
Welfare solidarity: Solidarity with people in need 
One of the key tasks of welfare states is to establish a social security system in order to protect people 
from market and social risks. This predominantly affects those who are ill, unemployed, unfit for work, 
old, or poor. Providing such protection was traditionally the domain of the national welfare state. In 
contrast to national welfare solidarity, European welfare solidarity means that the EU or EU countries 
jointly take responsibility for vulnerable individuals if they are EU citizens and reside in any of the 
member states.  
We tested to what degree citizens think that their nation state5 on the one hand and the European 
Union6 on the other should be responsible for guaranteeing social security to the following vulnerable 
groups: (1) the sick, (2) the elderly, and (3) the unemployed. These social groups are typical recipients 
of welfare state support and encompass individuals who are in need.  
                                                          
5 The wording of the question was the following: People have different views on what the [NATIONAL] government should be 
responsible for. Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or 
totally disagree. 
 (1) The [NATIONAL] government should guarantee access to health care for everyone in [COUNTRY]. 
 (2) The [NATIONAL] government should guarantee a decent standard of living for the elderly in [COUNTRY].  
 (3) The [NATIONAL] government should guarantee a decent standard of living for the unemployed in [COUNTRY]. 
6 The wording of question was the following: Now please don’t think about [COUNTRY], but about the European Union in 
Brussels and its responsibilities. Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you totally agree, tend to agree, 
tend to disagree or totally disagree.  
 (1) The European Union should guarantee access to health care for everyone in the EU.  
 (2) The European Union should guarantee a decent standard of living for the elderly in the EU.  











In country In other countries in the EU In other countries outside of
the EU
First  choice Second choice
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Figure 3: Welfare solidarity nationwide and in the EU 
Figure 3 depicts the distribution of answers aggregated across the 13 surveyed countries. An over-
whelming majority of respondents believe that the nation state should be responsible for the well-
being of individuals from the three mentioned social groups, irrespective of the reason for their vul-
nerability. Ninety-four percent of individuals support the idea that national governments should guar-
antee sick people health care and 98% of individuals agree that national governments should guaran-
tee the elderly decent living circumstances. On the other hand, only 82% of respondents want national 
governments to guarantee the unemployed a decent standard of living. Findings also demonstrate 
that the two territorial levels do not differ very much from each other. Ninety percent of respondents 
agree that the European Union should be responsible for sick and elderly Europeans. In contrast, 77% 
of respondents support the notion that the European Union needs to secure the standard of living of 
all unemployed Europeans. Despite the lower level of agreement, the latter rate still exceeds a two-
thirds majority. Hence, Europe seems to be a similar space of solidarity as the nation state. 
As in the case of fiscal solidarity, we asked respondents again to identify their territorial priority 
(national, European, or global) about where people in need should be helped first. By doing so, we 
forced respondents to clearly state their territorial preferences.7 
                                                          
7 The wording of the question was the following: There are people in need not only in [COUNTRY] and in the EU, but all over 
the world. Assuming a decision about priority has to be made: in your opinion, where should people in need be helped first? 
 (1) In [COUNTRY]. 
 (2) In other countries in the European Union. 
 (3) In other countries outside of the European Union. 
 And where should they be helped second? 
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Figure 4: Welfare solidarity and spaces of solidarity: first and second priority 
Figure 4 depicts the responses for the first and second choices to the questions. The majority of indi-
viduals (57%) chose to support people in need in their own country first. Fifteen percent of respond-
ents picked other Europeans in need first, while 28% prioritized helping individuals from countries 
outside of the EU.  In regard to respondents’ second priority, findings show that for the majority of 
respondents (62%), their second choice is clearly to help Europeans in need, while 21% picked helping 
their fellow citizens second, and a slightly lower proportion of respondents (18%) chose to help indi-
viduals outside of the EU as a second priority.   
Comparing the results of Figure 2 with those of Figure 4 shows that the differences between the 
three solidarity spaces are less pronounced in the case of welfare solidarity, a result we discuss in 
more detail elsewhere (Gerhards et al. 2019). In both cases, however, the majority of EU citizens 
choose to help the regions and the people who are in need within their own country first. And in both 
domains of solidarity, Europe lies between the world and the nation state as European solidarity 
comes second whereas only a small number of respondents took a purely cosmopolitan position of 
choosing to help countries and people outside of the EU. 
Conclusion 
What do the results presented in the last section mean in light of the philosophical debate between 
communitarians and cosmopolitans sketched out in the second section? While the cosmopolitans 
contend that, in its normative essence, solidarity is and should be a universal phenomenon, the com-
munitarians argue that solidarity should always be expressed in relation to a real, existing community. 
According to them, the more strongly established a community is, the more solidarity can be expected 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 (1) In [COUNTRY]. 
 (2) In other countries in the European Union. 













In country In other countries in the EU In other countries outside of
the EU
First  choice Second choice
THE L EGI T I MACY AND  S T RENGTH OF  NA T I ONAL ,  EURO PEAN ,  AND  GL OBAL  S OL I DARI T Y  
9 
from members of this community. As the nation state persists as the social space with the thickest net 
of institutions and interactions between people in spite of processes of globalization and Europeaniza-
tion, it seems legitimate from a communitarian point of view for national solidarity to be more pro-
nounced than European or global solidarity.  
At the same time, the net of institutions on the European level and interactions of citizens in the 
European Union territory are significantly thicker than the net of institutions and the interconnected-
ness between the citizens and nation states on the global level. Therefore, from a communitarian per-
spective, it is normatively justifiable when citizens also wish to show more solidarity with their Europe-
an neighbors, as they give more to the nation state than to the European Union, and they give more to 
the EU than to world society. 
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